

'Barnwell Manor'

Neutral Citation Number: [2014] EWCA Civ 137

Paragraph 24 states that parliament intended that the desirability of preserving the setting of Listed buildings should be given considerable importance and weight in the planning balance.



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Case No: C1/2013/0843

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
THE HON. MRS JUSTICE LANG
CO/4231/2012

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 18/02/2014

Before:

LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL, CIVIL DIVISION
LORD JUSTICE SULLIVAN
and
LADY JUSTICE RAFFERTY

Between:

BARNWELL MANOR WIND ENERGY LIMITED	<u>Appellant</u>
- and -	
(1) EAST NORTHAMPTONSHIRE DISTRICT COUNCIL	<u>Respondents</u>
(2) ENGLISH HERITAGE	
(3) NATIONAL TRUST	
(4) THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT	

Gordon Nardell QC and Justine Thornton (instructed by **Eversheds LLP**) for the **Appellant**
Morag Ellis QC and Robin Green (instructed by **Sharpe Pritchard**) for the **First, Second and Third Respondents**

The Fourth Respondent did not appear and was not represented

Hearing date: 23rd January 2014

Approved Judgment

21. In Heatherington, the principal issue was the interrelationship between the duty imposed by section 66(1) and the newly imposed duty under section 54A of the Planning Act (since repealed and replaced by the duty under section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004). However, Mr. David Keene QC (as he then was), when referring to the section 66(1) duty, applied Glidewell LJ's dicta in the Bath case (above), and said that the statutory objective "remains one to which considerable weight should be attached" (p. 383).
22. Mr. Nardell submitted, correctly, that the Inspector's error in the Bath case was that he had failed to carry out the necessary balancing exercise. In the present case the Inspector had expressly carried out the balancing exercise, and decided that the advantages of the proposed wind farm outweighed the less than substantial harm to the setting of the heritage assets. Mr. Nardell submitted that there was nothing in Glidewell LJ's judgment which supported the proposition that the Court could go behind the Inspector's conclusion. I accept that (subject to grounds 2 and 3, see paragraph 29 et seq below) the Inspector's assessment of the degree of harm to the setting of the listed building was a matter for his planning judgment, but I do not accept that he was then free to give that harm such weight as he chose when carrying out the balancing exercise. In my view, Glidewell LJ's judgment is authority for the proposition that a finding of harm to the setting of a listed building is a consideration to which the decision-maker must give "considerable importance and weight."
23. That conclusion is reinforced by the passage in the speech of Lord Bridge in South Lakeland to which I have referred (paragraph 20 above). It is true, as Mr. Nardell submits, that the ratio of that decision is that "preserve" means "do no harm". However, Lord Bridge's explanation of the statutory purpose is highly persuasive, and his observation that there will be a "strong presumption" against granting permission for development that would harm the character or appearance of a conservation area is consistent with Glidewell LJ's conclusion in Bath. There is a "strong presumption" against granting planning permission for development which would harm the character or appearance of a conservation area precisely because the desirability of preserving the character or appearance of the area is a consideration of "considerable importance and weight."
24. While I would accept Mr. Nardell's submission that Heatherington does not take the matter any further, it does not cast any doubt on the proposition that emerges from the Bath and South Lakeland cases: that Parliament in enacting section 66(1) did intend that the desirability of preserving the settings of listed buildings should not simply be given careful consideration by the decision-maker for the purpose of deciding whether there would be some harm, but should be given "considerable importance and weight" when the decision-maker carries out the balancing exercise.
25. In support of his submission that, provided he asked the right question – was the harm to the settings of the listed buildings outweighed by the advantages of the proposed development – the Inspector was free to give what weight he chose to that harm, Mr. Nardell relied on the statement in the speech of Lord Hoffmann in Tesco that the

weight to be given to a material consideration is entirely a matter for the local planning authority (or in this case, the Inspector):

“If there is one principle of planning law more firmly settled than any other, it is that matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive province of the local planning authority or the Secretary of State.” (p.780H).

26. As a general proposition, the principle is not in doubt, but Tesco was concerned with the application of section 70(2) of the Planning Act. It was not a case under section 66(1) or 72(1) of the Listed Buildings Act. The proposition that decision-makers may be required by either statute or planning policy to give particular weight to certain material considerations was not disputed by Mr. Nardell. There are many examples of planning policies, both national and local, which require decision-makers when exercising their planning judgment to give particular weight to certain material considerations. No such policies were in issue in the Tesco case, but an example can be seen in this case. In paragraph 16 of his decision letter the Inspector referred to Planning Policy Statement 22 Renewable Energy (PPS22) which says that the wider environmental and economic benefits of all proposals for renewable energy, whatever their scale, are material considerations which should be given “significant weight”. In this case, the requirement to give “considerable importance and weight” to the policy objective of preserving the setting of listed buildings has been imposed by Parliament. Section 70(3) of the Planning Act provides that section 70(1), which confers the power to grant planning permission, has effect subject to, inter alia, sections 66 and 72 of the Listed Buildings Act. Section 70(2) requires the decision-maker to have regard to “material considerations” when granting planning permission, but Parliament has made the power to grant permission having regard to material considerations expressly subject to the section 66(1) duty.
27. Mr. Nardell also referred us to the decisions of Ouseley J and this Court in Garner v Elmbridge Borough Council [2011] EWCA Civ 891, but the issue in that case was whether the local planning authority had been entitled to conclude that no harm would be caused to the setting of another heritage asset of the highest significance, Hampton Court Palace. Such was the weight given to the desirability of preserving the setting of the Palace that it was common ground that it would not be acceptable to grant planning permission for a redevelopment scheme which would have harmed the setting of the Palace on the basis that such harm would be outweighed by some other planning advantage: see paragraph 14 of my judgment. Far from assisting Mr. Nardell’s case, Garner is an example of the practical application of the advice in policy HE9.1: that substantial harm to designated heritage assets of the highest significance should not merely be exceptional, but “wholly exceptional”.
28. It does not follow that if the harm to such heritage assets is found to be less than substantial, the balancing exercise referred to in policies HE9.4 and HE 10.1 should ignore the overarching statutory duty imposed by section 66(1), which properly understood (see Bath, South Somerset and Heatherington) requires considerable weight to be given by decision-makers to the desirability of preserving the setting of

all listed buildings, including Grade II listed buildings. That general duty applies with particular force if harm would be caused to the setting of a Grade I listed building, a designated heritage asset of the highest significance. If the harm to the setting of a Grade I listed building would be less than substantial that will plainly lessen the strength of the presumption against the grant of planning permission (so that a grant of permission would no longer have to be “wholly exceptional”), but it does not follow that the “strong presumption” against the grant of planning permission has been entirely removed.

29. For these reasons, I agree with Lang J’s conclusion that Parliament’s intention in enacting section 66(1) was that decision-makers should give “considerable importance and weight” to the desirability of preserving the setting of listed buildings when carrying out the balancing exercise. I also agree with her conclusion that the Inspector did not give considerable importance and weight to this factor when carrying out the balancing exercise in this decision. He appears to have treated the less than substantial harm to the setting of the listed buildings, including Lyveden New Bield, as a less than substantial objection to the grant of planning permission. The Appellant’s Skeleton Argument effectively conceded as much in contending that the weight to be given to this factor was, subject only to irrationality, entirely a matter for the Inspector’s planning judgment. In his oral submissions Mr. Nardell contended that the Inspector had given considerable weight to this factor, but he was unable to point to any particular passage in the decision letter which supported this contention, and there is a marked contrast between the “significant weight” which the Inspector expressly gave in paragraph 85 of the decision letter to the renewable energy considerations in favour of the proposal having regard to the policy advice in PPS22, and the manner in which he approached the section 66(1) duty. It is true that the Inspector set out the duty in paragraph 17 of the decision letter, but at no stage in the decision letter did he expressly acknowledge the need, if he found that there would be harm to the setting of the many listed buildings, to give considerable weight to the desirability of preserving the setting of those buildings. This is a fatal flaw in the decision even if grounds 2 and 3 are not made out.

Ground 2

30. Grounds 2 and 3 are interlinked. The Respondents contend that the Inspector either misapplied the relevant policy guidance, or if he correctly applied it, failed to give adequate reasons for his conclusion that the harm to the setting of the listed buildings, including Lyveden New Bield, would in all cases be less than substantial. I begin with the policy challenge in ground 2. Lang J set out the policy guidance relating to setting in PPS5 and the Practice Guide in paragraphs 62-64 of her judgment. The contribution made by the setting of Lyveden New Bield to its significance as a heritage asset was undoubtedly a “principal controversial” issue at the inquiry. In paragraph 4.5.1 of his Proof of Evidence on behalf of the Local Planning Authority Mr. Mills, its Senior Conservation Officer, said: